Consider a first-price sealed-bid auction with interdependent valuations and private budget constraints. Focusing on the two-bidder case, we identify new sufficient conditions for the existence of a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies. In equilibrium, agents may adopt discontinuous bidding strategies that result in a stratification of competition along the budget dimension. Private budgets can simultaneously lead to more aggressive bidding (a high-budget agent leverages his wealth to outbid rivals) and more subdued bidding (competition becomes less intense among bidders at distinct budget levels). The presence of budget constraints may lead to multiple symmetric equilibria in the first-price auction.
Introduction
Private budgets arise in many economic situations, including auctions. Once bidders have multidimensional private information involving a value signal, which informs their preferences, and a budget, which defines their feasible strategy set, even simple bidding games exhibit nontrivial equilibria. Many familiar intuitions require qualification or reassessment.
For concreteness, consider a first-price sealed-bid auction for one item. Bidders simultaneously place bids, the highest bidder wins, and he pays his own bid. Private budgets affect equilibrium bidding in two opposing ways in this familiar setting. First, budgets dampen bids by introducing a spending limit. Che and Gale (1998) characterize this feature in their seminal analysis of the first-price auction with private budget constraints. 1 Assuming private values, they propose sufficient conditions that ensure equilibrium bidding strategies assume the canonical form β(s i w i ) = min b (s i ) w i
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In (1), s i is bidder i's private value, w i is his private budget, andb(·) is an increasing, continuous function that defines the bid of an "unconstrained" agent who bids less than his budget. Second, and less intuitively, budgets can amplify certain agents' equilibrium bids. A higher bid may be disproportionally effective at defeating budget-constrained rivals, thus giving a high-budget bidder a valuable strategic option. Exercising this option can lead to an equilibrium where agents adopt discontinuous bidding strategies, even in a symmetric setting. A stratification of competition between high-and low-budget bidders emerges in equilibrium. Hitherto underappreciated in the literature, these strategic implications complicate equilibrium bidding and affect the auction's efficiency and revenue potential.
To illustrate our argument, it is helpful to consider an example that conveys its central intuition. The following example is an extension of Vickrey's (1961) model. 2 Example 1. Consider a first-price sealed-bid auction for one item. There are two ex ante identical bidders. Each bidder i observes an independent, uniformly distributed signal s i ∈ [0 1] regarding his value for the item. Signals are private, but their distribution is common knowledge. If a bidder with value signal s i wins the auction with the bid b i , his payoff is s i − b i ; otherwise, it is zero. A fair coin flip resolves ties. It is well known that in this auction's Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, both bidders adopt the strategy s i /2.
Suppose, additionally, that each bidder has a budget w i , which is independent of his value signal. Budgets are private, but their distribution is common knowledge. With probability 1/2, a bidder's budget is 1/4; with probability 1/2, it is 3/4. A budget is a hard constraint on bids and a type-(s i w i ) bidder cannot bid above w i .
A tempting conjecture is that
is a symmetric equilibrium strategy in this enriched setting. In (2), which has the canonical form, a bidder follows the usual equilibrium strategy s i /2 until he exhausts his funds. Though intuitive, (2) cannot be a symmetric equilibrium strategy. If bidder j follows (2), then bidder i has a profitable deviation when s i = 1/2 − ε and w i = 3/4. According to (2), he should bid 1/4 − ε/2. But if he bids ε more, 1/4 + ε/2, his probability of winning jumps from approximately 1/2 to over 3/4. At infinitesimal added cost, this deviation is worth it. 3 Reflecting on the preceding reasoning, we are led to an equilibrium strategy with jump discontinuities. Figure 1 sketches β(s i w i ), this auction's symmetric equilibrium 2 Milgrom (2004) presents a related example with a common budget constraint. 3 Similar reasoning applies whenever the bid distribution has a mass point due to a mass point in the budget distribution. When this occurs, the first-price auction cannot have an equilibrium in continuous strategies. wheres = 1/3 ands = 11/27. 4 Both dampening and strategic consequences of private budgets are apparent in this example's equilibrium. The former is obvious. A high-valuation (s i >s ) low-budget (w i = 1/4) bidder hits his spending limit in equilibrium: his bid is capped.
More interesting and consequential are the strategic implications. First, a highbudget bidder's strategy features a prominent jump discontinuity that amplifies his bid ats. A high-budget bidder has the option of bidding above 1/4, thus outbidding with certainty a low-budget competitor. Exercising this option becomes worthwhile when his value exceedss. The intuition for the discontinuity ats is similar. Given that lowbudget agents cannot bid above 1/4, there is a chance of a tie at this bid. A low-budget bidder with valuation s i >s finds this outcome sufficiently attractive to actually bid 1/4. He would like to bid more to break the (possible) tie in his favor, but lacks the funds to do so.
Second, despite occasional jumps, on the margin bidding is less brazen due to a stratification of competition along the budget dimension. When an agent bids above 1/4, he need only worry about a competing bid from another high-budget bidder, which occurs with probability less than 1/2. Similarly, in equilibrium, a low-budget bidder of 4 We verify that the defined strategy is a symmetric equilibrium in Appendix A. The working paper Kotowski (2019) examines a generalized version of this example: valuations are distributed according to the continuous cumulative distribution function H(s) on [0 s], and budgets assume low (w) and high (w) values with probabilities p and 1 − p, respectively. The equilibrium remains qualitatively similar when w < s − s 0 H(z) dz < w.
type s i >s competes on the margin only against a low-budget adversary. 5 In each case, there is less incentive to bid aggressively since segregation has reduced competition in the relevant range of bids. ♦ Although the preceding observations appear to be specific to Example 1 or are perhaps an artifact of the discrete budget distribution, this is not the case. As explained in Section 3, the strategic amplification and the competitive stratification can arise even when budgets assume a continuum of values. Necessarily, the construction is more elaborate, but the intuition is the same. Focusing on the two-bidder case, we propose new sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium that satisfies the canonical form (1), even when values are interdependent. Relaxing these assumptions leads to a noncanonical equilibrium that echoes the intuition of Example 1. The resulting empirical confounds can be substantial. For example, a uniform distribution of value signals and budgets may result in a bimodal equilibrium bid distribution (Example 2). Budget constraints may also lead to multiple symmetric equilibria (Example 3). This is because jump discontinuities that arise in equilibrium reflect an underlying coordination problem. An increase in bid to a particular value may only be worthwhile if the other bidder adopts the same strategy.
Our study has three main contributions. First, our results offer guidance concerning bidding in first-price auctions by isolating the strategic implications of private budgets. The importance of the strategic dimension is surprising given the simplicity of the firstprice sealed-bid auction format.
Second, we offer a cautionary message for empirical studies. The conflicting dampening and amplifying responses to the budget constraint variable imply that bids need not be skewed in one direction. Local incentive constraints, which underlie many empirical methods for auction analysis, need not fully characterize equilibrium bidding. Even small changes in a bidder's type may lead to large changes in his equilibrium bid. We hope our analysis provides a useful step toward better integrating budgets in empirical analysis of auctions.
Third, our methods may be useful in further investigations of auctions with budget constraints or with other forms of multidimensional private information. The phaseplane analysis employed in Section 3 is both simple and informative of associated economic incentives.
Outline. Section 2 surveys the related literature. Section 3 generalizes Example 1 to allow for interdependent valuations and continuously distributed budgets. We examine both canonical equilibria and noncanonical, discontinuous equilibria. Section 4 presents a discussion of our results, including a comparison with the second-price auction. We also provide an example that demonstrates that budget constraints can lead to multiple symmetric equilibria in the first-price auction. Appendices A-D collect omitted proofs and calculations. 5 Consider the equilibrium bid of agent i with value signal s i ∈ (s s ). When he bids β(s i 1/4), bidder i wins the auction when s j < s i and w j = 1/4 or s j <s and w j = 3/4. If bidder i bids slightly more, he now wins when s j < s i + ε and w j = 1/4 or s j <s and w j = 3/4. Agent i's higher bid is effective only against a low-budget adversary. Che and Gale (1998) were the first to study standard auctions with private values and private budget constraints. 6 They investigate equilibria that satisfy the canonical form (1). In Section 3.1, we study canonical equilibria in a complementary class of cases, including those with interdependent values. Perreiras (2002, 2003) study the secondprice auction with private budgets and interdependent values. We discuss their results in detail in Section 4. In a similar setting, Li (2014a, 2014b) analyze all-pay auctions. Ghosh et al. (2018) study wars of attrition with private budgets.
Related literature
In developing our model, we suppress several embellishments commonly associated with budget constraints. Unlike Zheng (2001) , Jaramillo (2004), or Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2005) , we model budgets as hard bounds on bids, rather than as imperfections in bid-financing ability. We also abstract from the risk of collusion or the formation of bidding consortia due to limited liquidity (Cho et al. 2002) . Burkett (2016) argues that budget constraints solve a principal-agent problem when bidding is delegated to a third party. Budgets are exogenous in our model, as they would be in the absence of delegation.
Interest in the role of budgets in auctions has grown due to their salience in many Internet-related applications (Ashlagi et al. 2010 , Balseiro et al. 2015 and spectrum auctions (Cramton 1995 , Bulow et al. 2017 . Noting these applications, several authors build models to investigate budget constraints in sequential or multi-unit auctions (Pitchik and Schotter 1988 , Benoît and Krishna 2001 , Pitchik 2009 , Brusco and Lopomo 2008 , 2009 , Ghosh 2015 , Kariv et al. 2018 . Our model is not a special case of any of them.
The auction design problem following Myerson (1981) that incorporates budget constraints is particularly challenging and has been considered under various guises (Laffont and Robert 1996, Monteiro and Page 1998 , Che and Gale 1999 , 2000 , Maskin 2000 , Malakhov and Vohra 2008 , Pai and Vohra 2014 , Kojima 2014 , Baisa 2018 , Boulatov and Severinov 2018 , Carbajal and Mu'alem 2018 , Richter 2019 . Auction design with budgets has also spurred an interest among computer scientists. 7 Our analysis takes the auction format as given and examines equilibrium bidding. Che and Gale (2006) examine auction revenue when bidders have multidimensional types, which may include private financial constraints.
A symmetric auction with interdependent values
Consider the following adaptation of Milgrom and Weber's (1982) model of a first-price auction. There are two ex ante symmetric bidders. Let s i ∈ [0 1] be the value signal of bidder i. It defines his information about the item for sale. Value signals are independently and identically distributed according to the twice continuously differentiable cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) H(s i ). (We relax independence in Remark 3 below.) The associated probability density function (p.d.f.) h(s i ) is strictly positive and bounded. Given s i and s j , v(s i s j ) is bidder i's valuation for the item. The valuation function is continuously differentiable, strictly increasing in the first argument, nondecreasing in the second argument, v(0 0) = 0, and v(1 1) = v. If bidder i wins the auction with the bid b i , his payoff is v(s i s j ) − b i ; otherwise, it is 0. Ties are resolved with a uniform randomization.
When budget constraints are absent, Milgrom and Weber (1982) show that there exists a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium where all bidders adopt a common strategy, α(s i ), that solves
subject to α(0) = 0. Henceforth, we reserve the notation α(·) for this specific strategy. Generalizing the model, let w i ∈ [w w] be the budget of bidder i. Budgets are independently and identically distributed according to the twice continuously differentiable c.d.f. G(w i ). We assume that 0 ≤ w < v < w and that the associated p.d.f. g(w i ) is strictly positive and bounded for all w i ∈ [w w]. For convenience, we define G(w i ) = 0 if w i < w and G(w i ) = 1 if w i > w. A bidder's type (s i w i ) is private information; otherwise, the environment is common knowledge. We focus on a symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium and we henceforth suppress bidder subscripts.
A canonical equilibrium
Positing private values, Che and Gale (1998) identify a sufficient condition (see Remark 2 below) that ensures that the first-price auction has an equilibrium where bidders adopt a common canonical strategy, β(s w) = min{b(s) w}. The functionb(s), which is strictly increasing and continuous, defines the bid of an "unconstrained" bidder who bids less than his budget in equilibrium. Figure 2 illustrates a representative canonical strategy.
We first investigate conditions that ensure a canonical equilibrium exists in our model. As an initial step, we derive some properties ofb(·). If bidder j follows a canonical strategy, the expected payoff of a type-(s w) bidder i when he bidsb(x) ≤ w is
The first term in (4) is the expected payoff from defeating an opponent with a value signal less than x. The second term is the expected payoff from defeating an opponent with a value signal greater than x who has a budget less thanb(x). This term vanishes if b(x) < w. By computing the first-order condition, dU(b(x)|s w)/dx| x=s = 0, and defining the expressions 
we can characterizeb(s) at its points of differentiability as
Whenb(s) < w, (5) reduces to (3), the differential equation that characterizes the equilibrium strategy in the absence of budget constraints. To interpret (5) whenb(s) > w, we expand the equation and rearrange its terms. Omitting the function arguments for readability yields
Terms [A] and [B] are the expected marginal benefit of an infinitesimally higher bid. When the higher bid defeats an opponent with a value signal less than s, the payoff gain is v(s s) −b(s); otherwise, when it defeats an opponent with a budget less thanb(s), the payoff gain is η(s s) −b(s). 8 Term [C] is the expected marginal cost of a higher bid.
Further rearrangement of (6a) gives
Forb (s) to be positive, as assumed throughout its derivation, both numerator and denominator in (6b) must have the same sign. When the budget distribution is relatively dispersed and say g(b) ≈ 0, this is not a demanding requirement, as the denominator is positive. If the budget distribution is concentrated near some value and g(b) is relatively large, the denominator of (6b) may approach zero or be negative. Intuitively, when this occurs, the likelihood of defeating a budget-constrained opponent is large and a (highbudget) bidder wishes to increase his bid aggressively to capitalize on this opportunity. In Example 1, the return to a slightly higher bid spiked at the atom in the budget distribution and led to a discontinuous jump in bid. As (6b) reveals, an atom is not necessary to provoke a similar response. Motivated by the preceding discussion, we introduce a regularity condition that ensures the marginal returns to a slightly higher bid are moderate and well behaved. As explained below, it is a sufficient condition for a canonical equilibrium to exist when w = 0. Remark 2. Assumption 1 is implied by Assumption 5 of Che and Gale (1998) when the latter is applied to the case of independent budgets and value signals, as in our model. 9 When value signals and budgets are mutually independent, our contribution beyond Che and Gale's is to show that canonical equilibria continue to obtain in a setting with interdependent values and a weaker restriction on the budget distribution.
Assumption 1 has two parts. The first says that the denominator of (5) satisfies a single-crossing condition. Since η(s s) − δ(w s) < 0, any crossing must be from above. Thus, the second part is a technical restriction that ensures the crossing is strict. 
9 Che and Gale (1998) Generically, the equilibrium is unique in the class of symmetric equilibria in canonical strategies.
We provide a numerical example that illustrates an equilibrium in Section 3.3.
Identification ofb(·) and the proof of Theorem 1 To prove Theorem 1, we must first confirm that the functionb(·) exists with the stated properties. A natural approach is to (try to) solve (7) assumingb(0) = 0. This is premature. With interdependent values, zero may not be an optimal bid for an unconstrained bidder. A small bid may defeat a budget-constrained opponent with favorable information concerning the item's value. This attenuation of the winner's curse can inflate an agent's bid, even if he observes a low value signal. Moreover, (7) may lack an increasing solution that is defined for all s, as assumed throughout its derivation. Acknowledging the above complications, we identifyb(·) indirectly by focusing on the qualitative behavior of solutions to (7). To do so, we use phase-plane analysis to study the closely related plane-autonomous systeṁ
where
In analyzing this system, we are interested in the graphs of its solutions and not in its dynamics. Graphs of its solutions can be identified with integral curves of (7) since, following Birkhoff and Rota (1978, Chapter 5) , we observe that
Interpreting the problem as proposed lets us use graphical techniques to discern the behavior of candidate solutions over a large domain (Strogatz 1994 , Perko 2001 . Additionally, our reinterpretation placates the singularities encountered in a direct analysis of (7). Analysis of system (8) focuses on its nullclines and critical (or fixed) points. The nullclines are
These graphs characterize points whereṡ = 0 andḃ = 0, respectively. Their economic interpretation is the following. At b = ψ(s), the denominator of (7) changes sign. When η(s s) − δ(b s) > 0, marginally higher bids are relatively effective (conditional on s) at defeating a budget-constrained opponent. Otherwise, this dimension's marginal contribution to a bidder's payoff is more subdued. By definition, ν(s) = v(s s). Thus, ν(s) is a type-(s w) bidder's valuation conditional on his opponent observing the same value signal. If a type-(s w) agent bids more than ν(s), then he is overbidding conditional on defeating only an opponent with a value signal less than his own. A critical point occurs where nullclines intersect. Assumption 1 ensures that the analysis of system (8) is routine. Figure 3 illustrates a representative case. Six facts are noteworthy.
(i) The curve ν(s) runs from the origin to the figure's top-right corner. In the region below ν(s),ḃ < 0; otherwise,ḃ > 0.
(ii) Assumption 1 implies that ψ(s) is at most single-valued. When not empty, ψ(s) is a continuous curve. 11 In the region below ψ(s),ṡ > 0; otherwise,ṡ < 0.
(iii) There exists at least one critical point when w = 0 (Lemma B.2 in Appendix B). For simplicity, Figure 3 shows an instance with one critical point at (s 0 b 0 ). Multiple critical points do not affect Theorem 1, though an extended analysis is needed to identifyb(·). We outline the identification ofb(·) in the case of multiple critical points in the working paper (Kotowski 2019) .
(iv) The ratioḃ/ṡ is positive at point (s b) only when b is "in between" ν(s) and ψ(s). These are regions R 1 and R 2 in Figure 3 . In these regions, the solutions of (8) can be identified with increasing functions of s. Elsewhere, solutions have negative slope and, therefore, cannot constitute part of an admissible solution forb(s).
(v) Generically, each critical point is either a saddle point or a node (Lemma B.3). When there is one critical point, it is a saddle point.
(vi) When there is one critical point, of particular interest are the stable manifolds that approach it from below and above in regions R 1 and R 2 . (The Hartman-Grobman theorem implies that these manifolds are generically unique.) In Figure 3, these are the bold curves connecting (s 0 b 0 ) with the boundaries. Henceforth, we use b * (s) to denote the union of these solution paths' closures as a function of s. The function b * (s) is strictly increasing, continuous, and an integral curve of (7).
We are now ready to identify the functionb(·). This function must be strictly increasing, continuous, and an integral curve of (7). When there is one critical point, as in Figure 3 , only the stable solutions of (8) approaching the critical point-the function b * (s)-satisfy the stated requirements. So, in this case, we defineb(s) ≡ b * (s) for all s.
The identification ofb(s) illustrates the competing incentives facing a high-budget bidder. Consider again Figure 3 . Whenb(s) is confined to region R 1 , a type-(s w) bidder would like to bid more to capitalize on his opponent's (possible) budget constraint. His incentive to do so is moderated by the fact that he is overbidding conditional on defeating an adversary with a value signal less than his own, i.e.,b(s) > v(s s). In region R 2 , these incentives flip and v(s s) >b(s).
A standard argument lets us confirm that Theorem 1 characterizes an equilibrium. 12
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose bidder j adopts the strategy β(s w) = min{b(s) w}, whereb(s) satisfies the conditions stated in Theorem 1. (The preceding discussion has established the existence of this function.) The expected utility of bidder i of type (s w) who bidsb(x) is given by (4). Differentiating (4) yields
Hence, bidder i can increase his payoff by bidding less thanb(x). A parallel argument shows that when x < s, bidder i can increase his payoff by bidding more thanb(x). Together, the two cases imply that bidder i has no incentive to deviate from β(s w) to another bid in the range ofb(·). 13 Instead, suppose bidder i bids outside the range ofb(·). Any bid strictly exceedinḡ b(1) is dominated byb(1). The bid b ≤b(0) yields an expected payoff of
To complete the proof, it is sufficient to show that
, which implies the desired conclusion.
12 See Fang and Perreiras (2002) and Kotowski and Li (2014a) for similar proofs in the case of the secondprice and all-pay auctions with budget constraints. 13 We have shown that a type-(s w) bidder can improve his payoff by increasing his bid whenever it is less thanb(s). If β(s w) = w ≤b(s), then he cannot increase it above his budget constraint.
Remark 3. Theorem 1 generalizes to the case of affiliated value signals (Milgrom and Weber 1982) . In this case, let h(s i s j ) be the strictly positive, bounded, permutationsymmetric, and log-supermodular joint density of value signals. 14 Define h(x|s) and H(x|s) as the conditional p.d.f. and c.d.f., respectively, and let λ(x|s) := h(x|s)/ (1 − H(x|s)). The analogue of Theorem 1 holds if v(· x)λ(x|·) is nondecreasing, a common assumption (Krishna and Morgan 1997 , Lizzeri and Persico 2000 , Fang and Perreiras 2002 . This condition holds when, for example, v(s i s j ) = (s i + s j )/2 and h(s i s j ) = 4(1 + s i s j )/5. Intuitively, the restriction limits the informativeness of s i concerning s j relative to its impact on bidder i's own payoff. The supporting analysis is essentially identical to the preceding case and is omitted.
Remark 4. A closed-form expression forb(·) is unavailable, but the preceding analysis suggests how to approximate it numerically. First, identify a critical point in (8) through which the function must pass. The stable manifolds of system (8) approach this point with a slope equal to that of the negative eigenvector from the system's Jacobian matrix. An approximate linearized solution can be defined locally at the critical point. This solution can be extended to the domain's remainder with standard numerical methods, thus approximatingb(·).
Remark 5. Allowing for N > 2 bidders requires amending (4), the expression for an agent's expected payoff. Defeating an opponent with a low value signal or a low budget implies different conclusions concerning the item's value. Each possibility needs to be accounted for on an opponent-by-opponent basis. Kotowski and Li (2014a) present this extension for the all-pay auction with interdependent values. The equilibrium with N bidders in that setting is qualitatively similar to the two-bidder case. Che and Gale (1998) allow for N bidders and study canonical equilibria in the private-values case.
A noncanonical equilibrium
A canonical equilibrium may not exist in the absence of Assumption 1 or if w > 0. To investigate this possibility, we focus on the case where w > 0, as the logical parallel with Example 1 is easiest to appreciate. A canonical equilibrium may not exist when w > 0 because the marginal return to a slightly higher bid changes appreciably at w. A bid above w defeats a budget-constrained opponent while a bid below w does not. This change in a bid's marginal return is exaggerated in Example 1 by the mass point in the budget distribution at 1/4. As shown below, a mass point is not necessary to induce a similar jump discontinuity in the equilibrium strategy of a high-budget bidder. Consider the strategy illustrated in Figure 4 , which translates the intuition from Example 1 to a model with a continuous type space. It has three parts. First, a bidder with a low value signal bids less than w. Second, a high-budget bidder increases his bid discontinuously when his value signal iss. Third, a low-budget bidder cannot match the jump in a high-budget bidder's strategy ats. Competition is stratified and low-budget bidders with value signals s ∈ (s s ) compete only in a low range of bids. A novelty is that the distinction between high-and low-budget bidders is endogenous and changes with the agent's value signal. In Figure 4 (a), this boundary is given by the functionφ(·). If w <φ(s), the agent's budget is "low" (conditional on his value signal) and he bids less than w; otherwise, his budget is "high" and he bids above w. An important feature of the strategy illustrated in Figure 4 is that there are no gaps in its range, despite
While an equilibrium with the above characteristics can arise when w > 0, its presence is not assured. For some parameters, a canonical equilibrium may apply instead. To characterize all possibilities, we extend Theorem 1 to allow w ≥ 0. Concurrently, we also strengthen Assumption 1 (see Remark 1 above) to simplify the technical analysis. 
that satisfies the boundary conditionb(s) = lim s→s −b(s).
(b) Otherwise, β(s w) = min{b(s) w}. For all s <s, the functionb(·) is continuous, less than w, and is the solution of
that satisfies the boundary conditionb(0) = 0. For all s >s, the functionb(·) is continuous, greater than w, and for a.e. s >s,
Remark 6. Recall that (5) characterizes the bid of an unconstrained agent. Acknowledging the similarity between (5), (10b), and (10c), and noting that w > v (the item's maximal value), β(s w) =b(s) in the equilibrium defined in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 allows for both canonical and noncanonical equilibria. Which case applies depends on the economy's parameters. Two qualitatively distinct canonical equilibria are defined solely by part (b). The functionb(·) in a type-1 canonical equilibrium is characterized only by (10c). 15 This class subsumes the analysis in the preceding subsection. As in the preceding subsection, the functionb(·) coincides with the stable solutions of system (8), the function b * (·). Given Assumption 1 , a necessary and sufficient condition for a type-1 canonical equilibrium to exist when w ≥ 0 is that b * (·) exists and has domain [0 1]. Intuitively, such equilibria tend to arise when w is close to zero.
A type-2 canonical equilibrium is characterized by (10b) and (10c). 16 For low values of s, an agent bids less than w. In particular,b(s) = α(s), the equilibrium bid in the absence of budget constraints and the solution to (10b). 17 If there exists a value s α ∈ (0 1) such that α(s α ) = w, thenb(·) makes a continuous transition into the range of bids above w ats = s α . For s >s,b (s) is given by (10c). Given Assumption 1 , a necessary and sufficient condition for a type-2 canonical equilibrium is the following: if α(s α ) = w, then η(s α s α ) − δ(w s α ) ≤ 0. This condition must hold for (10c) to have an increasing solution at (s α w). Intuitively, type-2 canonical equilibria tend to arise when w is relatively large. See the working paper (Kotowski 2019) for an expanded account of type-2 canonical equilibria.
The third case corresponds to the noncanonical equilibrium sketched in Figure 4 . In this case, both parts (a) and (b) in Theorem 2 contribute to the definition of the equilibrium strategy. In the remainder of this subsection, we outline the construction of this equilibrium. The associated proofs are relegated to Appendix C. A numerical example is presented in Section 3.3.
Construction of a noncanonical equilibrium Paralleling Section 3.1, the following discussion presumes the existence of one critical point. The absence of a critical point or multiple critical points does not affect Theorem 2, though an extended analysis is required to identifyb(·). See the working paper (Kotowski 2019 ) for analysis of these cases.
We first introduce an assumption (henceforth maintained) precluding type-1 or type-2 canonical equilibria. It assures the applicability of the noncanonical case given Assumption 1 . Recall that b * (·) defines the stable solutions to system (8) and α(·) is the first-price auction's equilibrium strategy in the absence of budget constraints. 
. Thus, a sufficient condition for Assumption 2(b) to be satisfied is that the budget distribution is relatively concentrated near w. In this light, Example 1 can be interpreted as a limiting case where w = 1/4 is a mass point of the budget distribution. 
In words, a bidder with value signals is indifferent between the bids α(s) and μ(s). Lemma C.1 in Appendix C shows that (11) has a solutions ∈ [s * s α ] given the maintained assumptions. Givens that satisfies (11),b(·) is defined as follows. For s <s,b(s) solves (10b). Of course, this impliesb(s) = α(s) for s <s. For s ≥s,b(s) coincides with the increasing solution to system (8) passing through point (s μ(s)), which assures (10c) is satisfied. Figure 6 illustrates this definition in two representative cases. In Figure 6 (a), μ(s) = b * (s) andb(s) = b * (s) for all s >s. In Figure 6 (b), μ(s) = ψ(s) andb(s) < b * (s) for all s >s. There is a jump discontinuity inb(·) ats. 19 The values is pinned down during the definition ofb(·) andφ(·). It is the largest value for which the domain of these functions can be defined. 20 This solution may coincide with b * (s) and pass through the critical point. Givens andb(·), we can pin downb(·) andφ(·). The former solves (10a) subject to the boundary conditionb(s) = lim s→s −b(s). Differential equation (10a) resembles (10b), but accounts for the reduced competition given the jump in a high-budget bidder's strategy. This is captured by the "G(φ(·)) weightings" in the reversed hazard rate term.
The functionφ(·) defines the boundary between high-and low-budget bidders along which β(s w) is discontinuous. Accordingly, it is defined by an indifference condition. A type-(s φ (s)) bidder is indifferent between the bidsb(s) andφ(s). Thus, Uφ b (s)|s w =Ũφ φ (s)|s w
for all s ∈ [s s ], wherẽ
A subtle complication is that the definitions ofb(·) andφ(·) reference one another. Thus, a fixed point argument is needed to show that these functions exist with the stated properties.
To reinforce intuition forφ(·), recall Example 1. In that case, a high-budget bidder's strategy is discontinuous in a neighborhood ofs. A low-budget agent bids less than 1/4 when s ∈ (s s ), but his bid increases to 1/4 once s >s . The functionφ(·) generalizes this sequence of jump discontinuities to a continuum type space.
Verification that Theorem 2 describes an equilibrium mimics the proof of Theorem 1 and is relegated to Appendix C.
Remark 7. Absent Assumption 1 , the auction's equilibrium depends on the specifics of the model. When the function b → η(s s) − δ(b s) crosses zero multiple times, some crossings occur at values where the budget distribution is (relatively) concentrated. Around these values, a bidder has an incentive to increase his bid substantially as the marginal returns to a slightly higher bid rise significantly. Jump discontinuities around such values allowb(s), the bid of an unconstrained bidder, to "skip around" regions where (10c) lacks increasing solutions. Multiple discontinuities are possible if G(·) is sufficiently irregular. Despite similar intuition, identifying the analogues ofφ(·) and b(·) becomes challenging. Our proof does not extend immediately, as it relies on the concavity of G(·) for this step.
An example
An example can illustrate both canonical and noncanonical equilibria. Assumption 2 holds when 0 15 < w < 0 27; thus, a noncanonical equilibrium exists. Figure 8 (b) illustratesb(s), ψ(s), ν(s),φ(s), andb(s) when w = 0 2. The functionsb(s) and α(s) coincide when s is small, butb(s) jumps up ats ≈ 0 181. A high-budget bidder with that value signal increases his bid from 0 181 to 0 286-an increase of 58 percent. Thus, an agent's strategic response to an opponent's possible budget constraint can be quantitatively large. When w > 0 27, the equilibrium is again canonical, but of the type-2 variety. The jump discontinuity inb(s) disappears.
To highlight the empirical implications, Figure 8 (c) and (d) present histograms approximating the equilibrium bid distributions. In the canonical case, the bid distribution has a peak atb(0) ≈ 0 12 for the following reason. In equilibrium, the bid b < 0 12 is placed by a type-(s w) agent if and only if w = b. In contrast, the bid b > 0 12 is placed by a type-(s w) agent in two contingencies. In the first, w = b and s >b −1 (b); thus, the agent is constrained by his budget. In the second, w > b and s =b −1 (b); thus, the agent is unconstrained but finds it not worthwhile to bid more given his private information. The peak reflects the additional fraction of types covered by the second contingency. In the noncanonical case, the equilibrium bid distribution is irregular, with a valley between the bids 0 181 and 0 286. No agent bidding less than 0 181 in this example is constrained by his budget. However, it is not in his interest to bid more. Since few bids are placed between 0 181 and 0 286, the probability of winning does not increase commensurably with the payment conditional on winning with a bid in this range. Additionally, a bid above 0 286 is unattractive because the agent's value signal is relatively low. Conversely, no agent bidding above 0 286 wishes to bid less. Slightly lower bids defeat only a budget constrained opponent (who wishes to bid more than he can). In addition, bids below 0 181 are unattractive to a high value signal bidder. The item is sufficiently valuable to merit a higher bid. The indifference conditions (11) and (13) ensure that each type's incentives are balanced in equilibrium. The equilibrium bid distribution would be uniform on [0 1] in the absence of budget constraints. ♦
Discussion

The second-price auction
It is instructive to compare equilibrium bidding in first-and second-price auctions. In the case of private values, i.e., v(s i s j ) = s i , the second-price auction has an equilibrium where each type-(s w) agent bids min{s w} (Che and Gale 1998). Fang and Perreiras (2002) examine the second-price auction with interdependent values in a twobidder setting. They identify an equilibrium where each bidder's strategy is β II (s w) = min{b II (s) w} andb II (·) is an increasing function. Whenb II (s) < w, thenb II (s) = v(s s), which is the equilibrium strategy identified by Milgrom and Weber (1982) in the absence of budget constraints. Whenb II (s) ≥ w, thenb II (s) solves the differential equation
subject to the boundary conditionb II (1) = v. 21 There exists a values II such that b II (s) < w ⇐⇒ s <s II and, generally,b II (·) may be discontinuous ats II . While the resemblance of (7) and (15) is striking, three differences between the firstand second-price auctions are noteworthy. First, the boundary condition forb II (s) is predetermined. Second, the term η(s s) − b appears in the denominator of (15) instead of η(s s) − δ(b s). Third, the discontinuity that can arise in the second-price auction is qualitatively different from that identified in the first-price auction. There is no separation among high-and low-budget bidders in the second-price auction. A bidder with value signal s >s II bids above w and a gap in the equilibrium bid distribution may arise in the second-price auction. In contrast, the equilibrium bid distribution in the firstprice auction has connected support, even in a noncanonical equilibrium. This difference is due to the distinct pricing mechanisms. In the second-price auction, an agent bidding infinitesimally above a gap has no reason to reduce his bid. His probability of winning and his expected payment are unchanged if he bids a bit less. In the first-price auction, an agent bidding infinitesimally above a (hypothetical) gap can significantly reduce his expected payment without reducing his probability of winning. This implies that a gap in the equilibrium bid distribution cannot arise. 22 Che and Gale (1998, 2006) show that the first-price auction revenue-dominates the second-price auction in an independent private-values setting with financial constraints. It is straightforward to construct examples where this revenue ranking continues to hold when valuations are interdependent but agents' types are independent. 23 21 Equation (15) restates equation (11) from Fang and Perreiras (2002) . We specialize it to the case of independent types. Fang and Perreiras (2002) allow for affiliated values. 22 This reasoning does not apply when there are atoms in the equilibrium bid distribution, as in Example 1. In the example, the bid 1/4 is placed with positive probability in equilibrium. An agent bidding 1/4 would like to bid more but cannot due to his budget constraint. A bid slightly less than 1/4, in contrast, leads to a discrete fall in the probability of winning and is, therefore, not beneficial. We conjecture that the ranking applies generally when types are independent, though a proof of this claim is unavailable. If agents' types are affiliated, Milgrom and Weber (1982) prove that the second-price auction is revenue-superior in the absence of budget constraints. Taken together, the preceding observations imply that no revenue ranking exists between first-and second-price auctions that allows for both budget constraints and affiliated values.
Equilibrium nonuniqueness
McAdams (2007) shows that the first-price auction has a unique monotone pure strategy equilibrium when bidders are ex ante symmetric, types are affiliated, and values are interdependent. This conclusion does not extend to a setting with budget constraints. Recall that in a noncanonical equilibrium, an agent discontinuously increases his bid at some value signals and he conjectures the other bidder does likewise. Of course, this conjecture is correct in equilibrium, but the construction introduces an implicit coordination problem. Different values at which the common bidding strategy "jumps up" may be compatible with different equilibria, as illustrated by the following example. We confirm that the stated strategies define equilibria in Appendix D. In the β A equilibrium, the agents adopt the no-budget-constraints equilibrium strategy when s is small. Ats A = 1/9 their bids increase discontinuously from 2/27 to 1/3. In the β B equilibrium, the threshold value signal above which agents bid their entire budget iss B = 0. ♦
Comparative statics
The countervailing incentives associated with budget constraints typically lead to ambiguous comparative statics. For example, consider a "tightening" of financial constraints where the budget distribution is skewed in the sense of likelihood ratio dominance toward a distribution favoring lower budgets. 25 In the second-price auction, this change inflates the bid of an unconstrained bidder (Fang and Perreiras 2002) . In the first-price auction, an unconstrained bidder's response may go either way. There is now less incentive to bid aggressively because competition is reduced at higher bid levels. However, if budgets become more concentrated around particular values, it is easier to exploit the budget dimension for strategic gain. On balance, a bidder may respond with a higher or lower equilibrium bid. Example D.1 in Appendix D documents these phenomena. The comparative static relies on identifying the critical point under various scenarios. Since ν(s) is unaffected by changes in the budget distribution, movement of the critical point along ν(s) lets us infer howb(s) shifts up and down (locally) in response to changes in the budget distribution.
Reserve prices
Setting the optimal reserve price with budget-constrained bidders is challenging. Reserve prices screen bidders on both value and budget dimensions. Expected revenues may fall if bidders are disproportionately screened along the latter, as the probability of sale is particularly impacted. If agents are unlikely to be budget constrained, imposing the no-budget-constraints revenue-maximizing reserve price can be a sensible policy. For example, in the model of Example 1, if an agent has a low budget (w = 1/4) with probability p < 0 317, the revenue-maximizing reserve price is 1/2. This is also the revenue-maximizing reserve price in the absence of budget constraints. Otherwise, the optimal reserve price is less than 1/4.
Concluding remarks
We have examined the first-price auction under the assumption that agents face private budget constraints. Our analysis confirms that private budgets influence bidding in several distinct ways. They cap participants' bids while simultaneously encouraging more aggressive bidding in equilibrium by some agents. Together, these responses can lead to nontrivial equilibrium outcomes. For example, agents may adopt discontinuous bidding strategies; multiple equilibria are possible too. Two directions for further study are especially noteworthy. First, we have precluded many natural embellishments from our model such as resale, collusion, credit and financing, among others. As noted in Section 2, several studies have probed these questions, but much work remains. Second, the empirical implications of private budgets in auctions remain poorly understood. The development of new models or identification strategies to tackle such questions also seems especially promising. is a symmetric equilibrium in Example 1. Noting the symmetry of the example, we suppress agent subscripts. Recall that bidders' value signals are distributed uniformly on the unit interval and budgets assume values of 1/4 and 3/4 with equal probability.
We proceed to rule out deviations from β(s w) by each type of bidder given that his opponent adopts β(s w) as his strategy. It is sufficient to rule out deviations to other bids in the range of β(s w). To simplify notation, let β(s) := β(s 3/4) and β(s) := β(s 1/4). Similarly, let U(b|s) be the expected utility of a type-(s 3/4) bidder when he bids b and the other bidder follows the strategy defined above. Likewise, let U(b|s) be the expected utility of a type-(s 1/4) bidder when he bids b and the other bidder follows the strategy defined above.
Case 1. Consider a bidder with value signal s ∈ [0 1/3] and budget w = 3/4. Given that the other agent is bidding according to the strategy β(s w), the bid β(s) = s/2 wins the auction with probability s. Therefore, U(β(s)|s) = s(s − s/2) = s 2 /2. There are four classes of alternative bids.
(a) A deviation to β(x), where
, where x ∈ (1/3 11/27], yields an expected payoff of
Observe that dU(β(x)|s)/dx = (s − x)/2, which is negative for all s ≤ 1/3 and x ∈ (1/3 11/27]. Therefore, the most profitable bid in this range for an agent with value signal s ≤ 1/3 is lim x→1/3 + β(x) = 1/6 = β(1/3). By part (a) above, this bid is not a profitable deviation.
(c) A deviation to β(x), where x ∈ (1/3 1], yields an expected payoff of
Observe that dU(β(x)|s)/dx = (s − x)/2 ≤ 0 since s ≤ 1/3 ≤ x. Therefore, the most profitable bid in this range for an agent with value signal s ≤ 1/3 is infinitesimally above 1/4, i.e., lim x→1/3 + β(x) = 1/4. However,
for all s ≤ 1/3. Thus, β(x), where x ∈ (1/3 1], is not a profitable deviation.
(d) The bid 1/4 cannot be a profitable deviation for a high-budget agent. Given β(s w), the bid 1/4 is placed with strictly positive probability by a low-budget agent. However, a high-budget agent can strictly improve upon this bid by bidding infinitesimally more. The slightly higher bid increases his probability of winning by a discrete amount relative to the bid 1/4, which may result in a tie with positive probability. However, subcase (c) immediately above showed that a bid above 1/4 is not a profitable deviation for a bidder with value signal s ≤ 1/3.
Case 2. Consider a bidder with value signal s ∈ (1/3 1] and budget w = 3/4. When he bids β(s) = (5 + 9s 2 )/(18 + 18s), he defeats a low-budget opponent with probability 1 and a high-budget opponent with probability s. Therefore, his expected payoff is
There are four classes of alternative bids.
(a) A deviation to β(x), where x ∈ (1/3 1], yields an expected payoff of
The net gain is
, where x ∈ (1/3 1], is not a profitable deviation.
(b) A deviation to β(x) = x/2, where x ≤ 1/3, yields an expected payoff of U(β(x)|s) = x(s − x/2). Since x ≤ s, U(β(x)|s) is increasing in x. Thus, U(β(x)|s) ≤ U(β(1/3)|s). However, U(β(1/3)|s) − U(β(s)|s) = (1 − 2s − 3s 2 )/12 ≤ 0 for all s > 1/3. Therefore, β(x), where x ≤ 1/3, is not a profitable deviation.
(c) A deviation to β(x), where x ∈ (1/3 11/27], yields an expected payoff of
The net gain is (x|s) :
, where x ∈ (1/3 11/27], is not a profitable deviation.
(d) A deviation to the bid 1/4 can be strictly improved upon by a bid infinitesimally above 1/4. However, that bid was shown to be unprofitable in subcase (a) above.
Case 3. Consider a bidder with value signal s ∈ [0 1/3] and budget w = 1/4. When he bids β(s) = s/2, his expected payoff is U(β(s)|s) = s 2 /2. Cases 1(a) and 1(b) confirm that this bidder has no profitable deviation to any other feasible bid strictly less than 1/4. If this agent bids 1/4, he defeats a high-budget opponent only if the opponent's value signal is less than 1/3. He defeats a low-budget opponent with probability 1 if the opponent's value signal is less than 11/27 and with probability 1/2 if the opponent's value is more than 11/27. Thus, the agent's expected payoff is
It is simple to verify that U(β(s)|s) ≥ U(1/4|s) for all s ≤ 1/3. Therefore, the bid 1/4 is not a profitable deviation.
Case 4. Consider a bidder with value signal s ∈ (1/3 11/27] and budget w = 1/4. When he bids β(s) = (1 + 9s 2 )/(6 + 18s), his expected payoff is
There are three classes of alternative bids.
(a) A deviation to β(x) = x/2, where x ≤ 1/3, yields an expected payoff of U(β(x)|s) = x(s − x/2), which is increasing in x since s > x. Thus, U(β(x)|s) ≤ U(β(1/3)|s). However, U(β(1/3)|s) − U(β(s)|s) = −(1 − 3s) 2 / 36 ≤ 0. Therefore, the bid β(x), where x ≤ 1/3, is not a profitable deviation.
(b) A deviation to β(x), where x ∈ (1/3 11/27], yields an expected payoff of
The net gain is U(β(x)|s) − U(β(s)|s) = −(s − x) 2 /4 ≤ 0. Therefore, the bid β(x), where x ∈ (1/3 11/27], is not a profitable deviation.
(c) A deviation to the bid 1/4 yields an expected payoff of
The net gain from this bid is U(1/4|s) − U(β(s)|s) = (1 − s)(27s − 11)/108 ≤ 0 for all s ∈ (1/3 11/27]. Therefore, the bid 1/4 is not a profitable deviation.
Case 5. Consider a bidder with value signal s ∈ (11/27 1] and budget w = 1/4. When he bids β(s) = 1/4, his expected payoff is U β(s)|s = 14 27 s − 1 4
There are two classes of alternative bids.
(a) A deviation to β(x), where x ∈ (1/3 11/27], yields an expected payoff of
which is increasing in x because x ≤ 11/27 < s. However, U(β(11/27)|s) − U(1/4|s) = 44/729 − 4s/27 ≤ 0 for all s > 11/27. Thus, U(β(x)|s) ≤ U(β(11/27)|s) ≤ U(1/4|s). Hence, the bid β(x), where x ∈ (1/3 11/27], is not a profitable deviation.
(b) A deviation to β(x) = x/2, where x ≤ 1/3, yields an expected payoff of U(β(x)|s) = x(s − x/2). Since s > x, this expression is increasing in x. However, U(β(1/3)|s) − U(1/4|s) = (2 − 5s)/27 ≤ 0 for all s > 11/27. Thus, U(β(x)|s) ≤ U(β(1/3)|s) ≤ U(1/4|s). Hence, the bid β(x), where x ≤ 1/3, is not a profitable deviation.
Appendix B: Lemmas related to Section 3.1
Lemma B.1. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. 
We know that γ(b 0 ) = 0 and Assumption 1 implies that
Therefore, 4 ∂ṡ ∂b ∂ḃ ∂s > 0 as needed. Since the eigenvalues of J are real, by the Hartman-Grobman theorem, the critical point will be a saddle or a node if the eigenvalues are nonzero. This is equivalent to J having a nonzero determinant at (s 0 b 0 ):
A perturbation of any of the distributions or of the valuation function is sufficient to ensure that the preceding expression is nonzero.
Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 2
The proof of Theorem 2 has two parts. The first part concerns the construction of a noncanonical strategy and complements Section 3.2. Construction of a type-1 canonical equilibrium strategy proceeds as in Section 3.1. Type-2 canonical equilibrium strategies are discussed in the working paper (Kotowski 2019) . The second part verifies that the proposed strategy is a symmetric equilibrium.
C.1 Construction of a noncanonical equilibrium strategy
Outline. The construction of a noncanonical equilibrium strategy with a discontinuity proceeds in several steps. First, Lemma C.1 confirms the existence of the values introduced in (11). Givens, the definition ofb(·) is provided in Section 3.2 for the case of one critical point. The cases of no critical points or multiple critical points are outlined in the working paper (Kotowski 2019 ). Then we considerb(·) andφ(·). These functions are defined with reference to a fixed point of a particular operator, which is introduced in Remark C.4. Definitions C.1-C.4 and Lemma C.2 introduce preliminary concepts used in this definition. Subsequently, Lemmas C.3-C.6 prove some properties ofφ(·). Throughout we assume that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
Lemma C.1. ConsiderŪ(b|s w) defined in (12) . There existss ∈ [s * s α ] such that U(α(s)|s w) =Ū(μ(s)|s w). Moreover, μ(s) > w.
Proof. Recall that G(b) = 0 if b < w and μ(s * ) = w. We make two preliminary observations.
(i) Since G(α(s * )) = G(μ(s * )) = 0 and α(s * ) ≤ μ(s * ), the inequalityŪ(α(s * )|s * w) ≥ U(μ(s * )|s * w) follows immediately.
(ii) Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that ∂Ū(b|s α w)
SinceŪ ( Proof. Fix b(·) ∈ B and F(·) ∈ F . To simplify notation, let (s w) := (s w|b F).
(a) Assumption 1 says that G(w) is concave. Thus, G(w)(1 − H(s))(η(s s) − w) is strictly concave in w. It follows that G(w)(1 − H(s))(η(s s) − w) − wF(s) is strictly concave; hence w → (s w|b F) is also strictly concave.
Thus, by Lemma C.1,Ū(α(s)|s w) =Ū(μ|s w), which implies (s μ) = 0. Next, observe that The preceding definitions, Lemma C.2, and Definition C.4 imply that
Remark C.4 (Definition ofφ(·) andb(·)). Define
Remark C.5. By substitutingb andφ, we observe that
Proof. Sinceφ(s) =μ andb(s) = α(s), Lemma C.2(c) implies that˜ (s φ (s)) = 0. Suppose there existsŝ ∈ [s s 1 ) such that˜ (ŝ φ (ŝ)) = 0 and for all ε > 0 (sufficiently small), (ŝ + ε φ (ŝ + ε)) < 0. (By definition ofφ(s),˜ (s φ (s)) cannot be strictly greater than zero.) Thus, for s ∈ (ŝ ŝ + ε),φ(s) = (s|b F ) is the unique maximizer of˜ (s ·) on the interval [w w]. There are two cases. Case 1. Supposeφ(s) > w. Differentiating˜ (s φ (s)), substituting forF(s) andb (s), and applying the envelope theorem yields
Case 2. Supposeφ(s) = w. By continuity,φ(ŝ) = w, which implies˜ (ŝ w) = (b(ŝ) − w)F(ŝ) < 0 sinceb(ŝ) < w. Thus, we have derived a contradiction.
The above cases exhaust the possibilities; hence, for all s ∈ [s s 1 ),˜ (s φ (s)) = 0. By continuity, the preceding conclusion applies to the boundary s =s 1 as well.
Lemma C.4. The functionφ(s) is decreasing.
This implies that˜ (ŝ φ (ŝ)) > 0. Thus,φ(ŝ ) must be the smallest value that solves (ŝ φ (ŝ )) = 0. Since˜ (s ·) is strictly concave,φ(ŝ ) <φ(ŝ).
Lemma C.5. Supposeφ(s) > w. Then ∂˜ (s w)/∂w| w=φ(s) = ∂Ũφ(b|s w)/∂b| b=φ(s) ≥ 0.
Proof. The equality follows immediately from Remark C.5. That the derivative is greater than zero when evaluated atφ(s) follows from the definition ofφ(s). The valuẽ φ(s) is either the smallest solution of φ →˜ (s φ) or the maximizer of this function. As the function is concave, its derivative must be nonnegative atφ(s) whenφ(s) > w. 
Recalling the definition ofφ(·) and that˜ (s φ (s )) = 0, we conclude that φ(s ) = w.
C.2 Verification of equilibrium
Let β be the strategy described in Theorem 2. We will verify that an agent does not have an incentive to deviate to an alternative feasible bid in the range of β given that the other agent bids according to β. In a type-1 canonical equilibrium, the proof of Theorem 1 applies. In a type-2 canonical equilibrium, the range of β equals the range ofb(·) and the argument below applies. 26 Finally, in a noncanonical equilibrium, the range of β is characterized by four segments: (a) the functionb(s) for s <s, (b) the functionb(s) for s ∈ [s s ), (c) the functionφ(s) for s ∈ [s s ), and (d) the functionb(s) for s >s. We divide our argument accordingly. Writing s − and s + for left-and right-hand limits, respectively, we observe thatb(s − ) =b(s + ) ≤b(s − ) = w =φ(s − ) ≤φ(s + ) =b(s + ). (a) For all s <s,b(s) = α(s), the equilibrium bidding strategy in a first-price auction without budget constraints. Therefore, this bidder has no profitable deviation to any alternative bidb(x), where x <s (Milgrom and Weber 1982) . By continuity, the bidb(s − ) is also not a profitable deviation.
(b) If this agent bidsb(x), where x ∈ [s s ), his payoff is
Differentiating with respect to x and substitutingb (x) as defined in (10a) gives
is not a profitable deviation.
(c) If this agent bidsφ(x) for x ∈ [s s ), his payoff is
The inequality follows from s ≤ x. The final equality follows from the definition ofφ. See (13), (14), and Remark C.5 above. Thus, U(φ(x)|s w) ≤ U(b(x)|s w) ≤ U(b(s)|s w), where the final inequality is implied by subcase (b) above. The first inequality follows fromφ (x) ≤ 0 and η(s x) ≥ η(x x). The second inequality follows from Lemma C.5, which shows that the term in square brackets is nonnegative. Thus, each of these bids is dominated byφ(s w ) = w. If s ≤s , then U(φ(s w )|s w) ≥ U(φ(s)|s w) = U(b(s)|s w) and the same argument as in Case 2 shows that this bidder has no profitable deviation to any bid belowφ(s) as well.
Similarly, if s ≥s , then U(φ(s w )|s w) ≥ U(w|s w). Verifying that bids below b(s ) = w are not profitable deviations proceeds similarly to the argument in Case 1, subcases (a) and (b). A deviation to the bidb(x), where x >s, is not feasible.
Case 4. Consider a type-(s w) bidder where s ≥s and w ≥φ(s − ). The same argument as in the proof of Theorem 1 shows that this agent has no profitable deviation to any bid in the range ofb(x) for x ≥s. In particular, this implies that he prefers β(s w) to the bidb(s − ) =φ(s), and so the same argument as in Case 3 above shows that he cannot gain by deviating to a bid less thanφ(s).
The preceding cases show that a type-(s w) bidder does not have a feasible, profitable deviation from β(s w) given that the other bidder also adopts this strategy.
Appendix D: Examples
Example 3 (calculations)
We confirm that The β A equilibrium. Suppose bidder j adopts the strategy β A (s). All bids in the range (2/27 1/3) are dominated by the bid β A (1/9) = 2/27. Thus, to confirm that β A is an equilibrium strategy, it is sufficient to rule out deviations by bidder i to other bids in the range of β A .
Consider bidder i with value signal s ≤ 1/9. If he bids β A (s) = 2s/3, his expected payoff is (2/3)s 3/2 . Since 2s/3 is the symmetric equilibrium strategy in the absence of budget constraints, bidder i has no profitable deviation to any bid in the range [0 2/27]. If he bids 1/3, he wins for sure if his opponent's value signal is less than 1/9 and he wins with probability 1/2 if his opponent's value signal is more than 1/9. Thus, his expected payoff is 1 9
s + E[S j |S j ≤ 1/9] − 1 3 + 1 − 1/9 2 s + E[S j |S j > 1/9] − 1 3 = 2 9 3s − 2 9
For all s ≤ 1/9, (2/9)(3s − 2/9) ≤ (2/3)s 3/2 . Thus, β A (s) is an optimal bid for bidder i when s ≤ 1/9. Now consider bidder i with value signal s > 1/9. If he bids β A (x) = 2x/3 for some x ≤ 1/9, his expected payoff is √ x(s + E[S j |S j ≤ x] − 2x/3) = √ x(s − x/3) ≤ (1/3)(s − 1/27). Clearly, (1/3)(s − 1/27) ≤ (2/9)(3s − 2/9) for all s ≥ 1/9. Thus, he has no profitable deviation from 1/3 to any bid b ∈ [0 2/27].
As the setting is symmetric, we conclude that β A is a symmetric equilibrium strategy. The β B equilibrium. Suppose that bidder j adopts the strategy β B (s) = 1/3. The expected payoff of bidder i with value signal s when he bids 1/3 is
If bidder i bids less than 1/3, his expected payoff is zero as he loses the auction with certainty. Furthermore, bids above 1/3 are not feasible. Thus, 1/3 is a best response for bidder i given bidder j's strategy, and so β B is a symmetric equilibrium strategy.
Example D.1. Suppose there are two bidders with uniformly distributed value signals on the unit interval. Suppose v(s i s j ) = s i + s j . Consider three budget distributions on [0 2]: G 0 (w) = w/2, G 1 (w) = w/2, and G 2 (w) = w(4 − w)/4. Each satisfies Assumption 1 . The distribution G 0 likelihood ratio dominates G 1 and G 2 . There is one critical point given each budget distribution. Given G 0 , the critical point occurs at (s 0 b 0 ) = (0 1056 0 2111). Given G 1 , the critical point occurs at (s 1 b 1 ) = (0 0864 0 1728). Finally, given G 2 , the critical point occurs at (s 2 b 2 ) = (0 1264 0 2528). By Theorem 1, the function that defines the bid of an unconstrained bidder,b(s), passes through the critical point in each case. This implies that "tightening" the budget distribution from G 0 to G 1 induces a lower bid by an unconstrained bidder with a value signal s ≈ 0 1. Conversely, tightening the budget distribution from G 0 to G 2 induces a higher bid by an unconstrained bidder with a value signal s ≈ 0 1. ♦
